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UNDER A CRUEL SUN:1 MY LIFE AS A FEMALE JUDGE
AND UNDERGROUND EDUCATOR UNDER THE SOVIETS,
THE TALIBAN, AND THE AMERICANS
MARZIA BASEL* & DANA MICHAEL HOLLYWOOD**
I. AFGHANISTAN: A STATE IN SEARCH OF A NATION
II. THE SOVIETS: THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL
III. THE TALIBAN: JOURNEY INTO THE WHIRLWIND
IV. THE AMERICANS: TURNING IN A WIDENING GYRE IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM
EPILOGUE
This essay is a collaboration between Judge Marzia Basel and
Dana Hollywood, editor-in-chief of the Journal of Women and
the Law. Portions of the text in italics represent the experiences
and views of Judge Basel. Text in roman type solely represents
the opinions of Dana Hollywood and should in no way be attrib-
uted to Judge Basel.
Three forces have shaped my life as an Afghan woman. Each
reduced my country to rubble, reduced the rubble to dust, and
resulted in one of the deadliest conflicts of the second half of the
twentieth century.2
1. The authors gratefully acknowledge that the title and structure of this essay are
derived from an extraordinary memoir, UNDER A CRUEL STAR, by Heda Margolius Kovily.
See HEDAMARGOLIUSKOVALY, UNDERACRUELSTAR (Franci Epstein & Helen Epstein trans.,
1986). Ms. Kovily's stunningly beautiful account as a Czech Jew chronicles the Nazi invasion
of Czechoslovakia, her deportation to Auschwitz, the post-war years under Stalin, and the
arrest, conviction, and execution of her husband in the infamous 1952 Slansky trial. Id.
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Taliban. She served in a special category on the Loya Jirga Commission in 2002 and with
various U.N. and other international agencies during the time of Afghanistan's transition.
Judge Basel is the founder and director of the Afghan Women Judge's Association.
** J.D. candidate, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
M.A.L.D., magna cum laude, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
B.A., magna cum laude, Boston University. The author is a military intelligence officer in
the United States Army. The views expressed in this essay are solely those of the author and
in no way represent the views of the United States Army. The author would like to thank
Christie Warren and Phyllis Cox for their assistance with the article.
2. During Afghanistan's two decades of war:
Nearly 2 million Afghans have been killed... (as well as at least 15,000 Soviet
soldiers during the 1980s), and 600,000 to 2 million wounded. More than five
million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran, producing the world's largest single
refugee population since 1981, while at least 2 million more Afghans were
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The first force was the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union in 1979 and the Soviet-dominated Communist period, an era
that promised social change and modernity but instead wrought
repression and terror. The second was the medieval labyrinth that
was rule under the Taliban, a brutal and misogynistic reign of
terror that instituted a nightmarish policy of sexual apartheid.4 The
third was the American invasion in September 2001, an effort that
sought to slay monsters it had created more than a decade earlier.
I. AFGHANISTAN: A STATE IN SEARCH OF A NATION
The stunning tragedy which is contemporary Afghanistan is
matched by its stunningly rugged and diverse beauty. Geographic-
ally, the country encompasses snow-covered mountains, rolling steppe,
and uncultivable deserts.' Afghanistan covers some 245,000 square
miles, an area approximately the size of Texas.' "Afghanistan is
completely landlocked, bordered by Iran to the west.., by the Central
Asian States of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to the north
and northeast.., by China at the easternmost top of the Wakhan
internally displaced. Thus, more than 50 percent of Afghanistan's indigenous
population (estimated at 15 to 17 million persons at the war's beginning [in
1979], now estimated to be as many as 22 million) became casualties - killed,
wounded, or made homeless by the war.
LARRY P. GOODSON, AFGHANISTAN'S ENDLESS WAR 5 (2001) (citations omitted).
3. Under "the first communist regime of 1977-1979... 50,000 to 100,000" Afghans were
killed "in purges of potential opponents." Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The
Role of Rule of Law for the Women of Afghanistan, 42 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 357
(2004). "During the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion and occupation, '80,000 Afghan guerillas
and a million Afghan civilians are believed to have died, and a third of the population fled
the country' in horror." Talya Friedman, Cures to the Enigmatic Taliban Plague: Legal and
Social Remedies Addressing Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan, 23 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 81, 82-83 (2001) (quoting MARY LOUISE CLIFFORD, THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF
AFGHANISTAN 192-93 (1989)).
4. Sexual apartheid has been defined as "the oppression of individuals, and their
exclusion from equal enjoyment of human rights, on the grounds that they are women.
Sexual apartheid can be more subtle than racial apartheid because the forms of oppression
are woven into the fabric of society. The agents of modern sexual apartheid consider the
subordinate and domestically oriented role and status of women part of the natural order,
and assume women's servitude as a condition of society itself."
Guglielmo Verdirame, Testing the Effectiveness of International Norms: UN Humanitarian
Assistance and SexualApartheid in Afghanistan, 23 HUM. RTS Q. 733, 734 n.6 (2001) (quoting
REBECCA COOK, THE ELIMINATION OF SEXUAL APARTHEID: PROSPECTS FOR THE FOURTH
WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN 3 (1995)).
5. RALPH H. MAGNUS & EDEN NABY, AFGHANISTAN: MULLAH, MARX, AND MUJAHID 2
(2002).
6. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AFGHANISTAN: THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (1997),
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/aftoc.html.
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Corridor ... and by Pakistan to the east and south."' Its diverse
topography is inhabited by an equally diverse population,' which
serves to undermine state-building and the emergence of a national
identity. As one scholar has noted, "Afghanistan has never been a
homogeneous nation but rather a collection of disparate groups divided
along ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial lines and forced together
by the vagaries of geopolitics."9 Although there has been much inter-
mingling over the centuries, the peoples of Afghanistan still have
distinct ethnic, physical, and linguistic differences.10 Recent estimates
suggest that Afghanistan may have a population of close to thirty
million people,'1 divided into approximately twenty main ethnic
groups. 2 A majority of Afghans can speak at least one of the two of-
ficial languages of Pushtu or Dari, " but over thirty different languages
are spoken.'4 Though the etymology of the term "Afghan" remains
unclear, until very recently the term was synonymous with Pushtu.1"
Thus, the use of the term to identify the nation dates at least as far
back as the eighteenth century, when Pushtun tribes inhabited central
Asia.16
The largest and traditionally most politically powerful ethnic
group, the Pushtuns, represent at least fifty percent of Afghanistan's
population.'" They are predominantly located in the south and east
of the country, though like a number of other Afghan ethnic groups,
they extend beyond Afghanistan."8 The Pushtun population in
Pakistan, for example, constitutes a major ethnic group of about
fourteen million people."9 "Despite the traditional dominance of the
Pushtuns, there are significant minorities in Afghanistan ....
These are largely nontribal minorities who speak Indo-European or
7. Id.
8. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FAcTBOOK: AFGHANISTAN (2005),
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html.
9. GOODSON, supra note 2, at 14.
10. See MAGNUS & NABY, supra note 5, at 1-2.
11. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 8.
12. MAGNUS & NABY, supra note 5, at 10.
13. Id. at 13.
14. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 8.
15. MAGNUS & NABY, supra note 5, at 11.
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 10, 12.
18. GOODSON, supra note 2, at 14.
19. Syed Saleem Shahzad, Pakistan the Odd One Out, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003,
reprinted in S. ASIA RES. INST. FOR POLY DEV. (2003), http://www.sarid.net/conflict-
zone/pakistan/03sepl6-pakistan-the-odd-man-out.htm.
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Ural-Altaic languages and combine Western with Central Asian
physical traits."2 The most numerous, at between one-fourth and
one-fifth of the population, are the Tajiks. 21 Tajiks inhabit the
northeastern part of the country and spill over into the former
Soviet Republic of Tajikistan.22 "Tajiks appear to have Persian
features and speak Dari,"23 the Afghan dialect of Farsi or Persian.24
Other sizeable ethnic groups include the Hazaras, the Uzbeks, and
the Aimaq, which are roughly equal in size,25 in addition to less
numerous but still substantial Turks, Kazaks, Sikhs, Hindus, and
Jews.2" This incredible "ethnic mixture has traditionally known a
high propensity for violence, often between ethnic groups, subtribes,
and even cousins."" As one scholar has accurately remarked, "[o] nly
outside threats seem to unite the Afghans, and those alliances are
temporary and limited. When the threat is eliminated or suffi-
ciently reduced, people return to regular patterns of traditional
warfare."2
Like Afghanistan's topography and multifaceted ethnic
cleavages, religion fosters divisions within Afghan society. Although
Afghanistan is a Muslim country, sectarian differences over Qur'anic
and legal interpretations deeply divide Afghans.29 Approximately
eighty-five percent of the population is Hanafi Sunni and the
remainder Jafari Shi'a. ° This religious division results in a more
20. GOODSON, supra note 2, at 16.
21. Id.; MAGNUS & NABY, supra note 5, at 10.
22. See GOODSON, supra note 2, at 15, 16.
23. MARTIN EwANS, AFGHANISTAN: A SHORT HISTORY OF ITS PEOPLE AND POLITICS 7
(2002).
24. M. HASSAN KAKAR, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASIONAND THE AFGHAN RESPONSE,
1979-1982, 1 (1995).
25. MAGNUS & NABY, supra note 5, at 10.
26. Id.
27. GOODSON, supra note 2, at 17.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 17-19.
30. Id. at 17. "Although the followers of Islam belong to a single community of believers,
there are two major historic divisions: Sunni and Shii. Sunni Muslims constitute 85 percent
of the world's Muslims; Shii about 15 percent." JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH
4 (1988). The seeds of the schism date back to the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Id. at
37. Prior to his sudden death in 632 AD, he had left no instructions as to whom should
succeed him as head of the Islamic movement. See id. at 37-38. One group maintained that
the successor should be elected; another held that the only legitimate heirs to his authority
were his blood descendants. See id. at 38-39. The rift erupted twelve years after
Muhammad's death, with the choosing of the third khalifa (successor or deputy). See id. One
group supported Uthman, a rich nobleman with no blood ties to the Prophet. See id. at 39.
Another group supported Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law. Id. Though Uthman
prevailed as the khalifa, Ali's followers, later to be called Shi'i (shiat-u-Ali, party of Ali)
eventually galvanized a movement known as Shi'ism. Id. at 39.
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basic gap between the groups: "Shi'as are among the most economi-
cally disadvantaged people in Afghanistan."'"
Islam descends from the Semitic religions and shares with
Judaism and Christianity the concepts of "an uncompromising
monotheism, the belief in God's revelation, His prophets.., and the
Day of Judgment."32 'The period of pre-Islamic Arabia - known as
Jahiliyyah, or the Age of Ignorance" was defined by a polytheistic
culture and "a belief that gods and goddesses protected individual
tribes."33 "Allah, the supreme high god, was the creator and sustainer
of life but remote from everyday concerns . . . ."" One night in the
month of Ramadan 610 A.D., during the Jahiliyyah, God sent the
angel Gabriel to reveal his word to Muhammad, a successful busi-
nessman 5 "'Muhammad continued to receive divine revelations" from
God for twenty-two years.36 For Muhammad and his followers,
"heeding God's warning required turning away from the path of
unbelief and turning toward.., the straight path (sharia) or law of
God."37 The revelations God made to Muhammad are collected in the
Qur'an. As Islam's sacred scripture, the Qur'an provides both Islam's
core tenets and the criteria for being Muslim.3" The Qur'an contains
legal prescriptions, but consists primarily of broad moral directives
indicating what Muslims "ought to do."39 Over time, Islamic stan-
dards gradually replaced earlier tribal laws and Arab customs.4"
31. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, AFG. REPORT
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996 (1997), http://www.usemb.se/human/1996/southasia/
afghanistan.html [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996].
32. ESPOSITO, supra note 30, at 3.
33. Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women: An
Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 311, 314 (1995) (citation
omitted).
34. ESPOSITO, supra note 30, at 5.
35. JOHN BAGOT GLUBB, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MUHAMMAD 83-84 (1970); see also
ESPOSITO, supra note 30, at 8.
36. ESPOSITO, supra note 30, at 8 (indicating that the revelations spanned from 610-632
A.D.).
37. Id. at 14.
38. Sayeh & Morse, supra note 33, at 315 (citing ESPOSITO, supra note 30, at 8-9).
39. ESPOSITO, supra note 30, at 79.
40. Id. at 79-80.
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II. THE SOVIETS: 41 THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL
I was born east of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, in 1968 to
a middle class family. My father was a judge and inculcated in me
both a love of learning and a strong sense of public service. He would
often repeat to me the maxim "to those who are given much, much is
expected. " I was indeed given much; born into a family that adored
me, I was told I could do anything. I began school with the intent of
one day becoming a judge, like my father. At that time, I never
considered gender as a restraint on what I could achieve. This was
the Afghanistan of the past, a time when women had the right to
send their children to school, to vote, to serve their community, and
to walk down the street without a male escort.
The movement for women's rights in Afghanistan dates back to
as early as 1928, when Queen Souriya worked to open schools for
girls, in opposition to Afghan tradition.42 "Her husband, King
Amanullah, abolished child marriages, promoted universal edu-
cation for girls and boys, and even imposed Western European
dress codes on the population of Kabul."43 King Zahir Shah, who
ruled Afghanistan from 1933-1973, continued these progressive
reforms.44 The Constitution of 1964, promulgated by King Zahir
Shah, created a two-chamber legislature. Of the deputies who
served in the legislature, the King appointed one-third, the people
elected one-third, and provincial assemblies indirectly selected one-
third.45 Afghanistan's new Constitution guaranteed equality to
41. There are several excellent accounts of the 1979-1989 Soviet war in Afghanistan,
which would prove to be the Soviet Union's last "hot war." The best is the brilliant account
provided by M. Hassan Kakar. M. HASSAN KAKAR, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION AND
THE AFGHAN RESPONSE, 1979-1982 (1995). The book only covers the period up to 1982, when
the author was jailed by the Kabul regime as a dissident. Id. at 16, 379. Nonetheless, an
epilogue chronicles the Soviet's disastrous final years in Afghanistan. Id. at 257-300. See
generally SVETLANAALEKSIEVICH ETAL., ZINKY BOYS: SOVIET VOICES FROM THE AFGHANISTAN
WAR (Robin Whitby trans., W. W. Norton & Co. 1992); ANTHONYARNOLD, AFGHANISTAN: THE
SOVIET INVASION IN PERSPECTIVE (1985); ANTHONYARNOLD, FATEFUL PEBBLE: AFGHANISTAN'S
ROLE IN THE FALL OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE (1993); ARTEM BOROVIK, THE HIDDEN WAR: A
RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS AccOuNT OF THE SOVIET WAR IN AFGHANISTAN (1990); DIEGO
CORDOVEZ & SELIG S. HARRISON, OUT OF AFGHANISTAN: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SOVIET
WITHDRAWAL (2001).
42. Sonali Kolhatkar, The Impact of U.S. Intervention on Afghan Women's Rights, 17
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 12, 14 (2002).
43. Id.
44. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF S. ASIAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN
(2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eiIbgn/5380.htm (last updated Apr. 2005) [hereinafter
BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN].
45. Id.
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men and women, while simultaneously emphasizing the country's
Islamic roots.
4 6
After what seems a lifetime of bombs, mutilations, and deaths,
Ifind myself questioning whether there was ever a time my country
was not at war. Even now, as I recall those first few idyllic child-
hood years, I have to pinch myself to make sure that I am not
dreaming. Yet the fact is, for the first few years of my life there was
no war.
It was not until Judge Basel was about five years old when the
center failed to hold and things began to fall apart.47
Afghanistan's descent into conflict and instability in recent
times began in 1973 with the overthrow of King Zahir Shah.48 King
Zahir Shah was not regarded as an inspired leader.49 In fact, "he
hardly led at all, preferring to take it easy and to let the tribes govern
themselves.""° Positive remarks about Zahir Shah were sparse at that
time, but in the years that followed "almost all Afghans longed for his
return, considering what happened after he was removed from
power."5' Under the King, Afghanistan never amounted to much
more than a desperately poor, backwards, illiterate country largely
dependent upon foreign aid.52 Yet it was peaceful and independent;
it was a country in which a girl could reasonably entertain dreams of
going to school and college and serving her society as a lawyer.
Notwithstanding the 1964 Constitution, King Zahir Shah's reign
failed to produce substantial, lasting change, although one change in
particular would have far-reaching consequences for Afghanistan.53
46. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ch. I, art. 11 (1964), available at
http://www.afghanland.comfhistory/constitution.html.
47. The phrase is from the first stanza of a poem by W.B. Yeats. See W.B. YEATS, THE
SECOND COMING (1916), available at http://www.stfrancis.edu/en/yeats!.htm:
Turning and turning in a widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
48. See Mohamed Ismail Sloan, A Brief History of War in Afghanistan, http://www.
ishipress.com/afghans.htm.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Cosma Shalizi, Incipit Tragoedia, BACTRA REV. (1998) (reviewing M. HASSAN
KAKAR, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION AND THE AFGHAN RESPONSE, 1979-1982 (1995)),
http://cscs.umich.edu/-crshalizi/reviews/kakar-soviet-invasion.
53. See BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN, supra note 44.
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Zahir Shah had "permitted the growth of unofficial extremist parties
on both the left and the right. These included the communist People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had close ideological
ties to the Soviet Union."54
In the early 1970s, the country was beset by serious economic
problems. 5 "The country's plight became even worse when the rains
failed in the years between 1969 and 1972. By 1971, there was
widespread famine and.., as many as 100,000 people.., died."56
Maintaining that the King had mishandled the economic crisis, the
King's cousin and former Prime Minister, Sardar Mohammad
Daoud, seized power in a military coup on July 17, 1973."7 "Daoud
abolished the monarchy," proclaimed a republic, "abrogated the
1964 Constitution," and ambitiously appointed himself President,
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Defense.5"
Although Daoud was considered a nationalist, during his decade-
long stint as Prime Minister from 1953 to 1963, he had established
close ties with Moscow and entered into a number of agreements for
economic and military aid.59 Predictably, Moscow cheered Daoud's
takeover and, during a visit to Moscow the following June, the
Soviets agreed to provide an additional $600 million in economic
assistance to Kabul.6 ° Concerns in Washington led U.S. Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger to travel to Kabul in November 1974.
Shortly after Kissinger's trip, a delegation from the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) offered its own economic and
technical assistance. 1 With Daoud's bloodless coup, Afghanistan
lost its independence. Beginning with that act and for the next
twenty years, Afghanistan would be a pawn in the Cold War. When
the Cold War finally ended in the late 1980s, it went from being a
pawn to a failed state, and the primary battleground upon which to
wage the world's next great conflict: the War on Terror.
Prime Minister Daoud's tenure would be short-lived.6 2 "On
April 27, 1978, the P.D.P.A. initiated a bloody coup, which resulted
54. Id.
55. See EWANS, supra note 23, at 126.
56. Id.
57. BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN, supra note 44.
58. EWANS, supra note 23, at 130.
59. DOUGLAS MACEACHIN, PREDICTING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: THE
INTELLIGENCE CoMMuNITY's RECORD 3, available at http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/
afghanistan.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id. at 5.
62. See BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN, supra note 44.
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in the overthrow and murder of Daoud and most of his family."63
This was sparked partly by Daoud's growing unpopularity, but
more directly by his attempts to suppress the communists.64 As
security consultants, he had used SAVAK, the despised secret police
of the Shah of Iran.65 SAVAK was blamed with the assassination of
Mier Akbar Khybar, a highly regarded and patriotic leader of the
Left.66 As one scholar has written, "[t]he coup d'6tat... established
a new pattern that was to dominate Afghan politics for the next
decade and a half - a pattern of total dependence on the Soviet
Union."67 The Red Orchestra6" had begun.
The P.D.P.A. proved to be a case-book study on how not to win
a country's "hearts and minds." During its first eighteen months in
power, the atheistic P.D.P.A. brutally imposed decrees forcing
"compulsory social changes, including coeducational schooling,
prohibition of forced marriages, and the unveiling of women."69 Many
segments of Afghan society, including the traditional elite and
religious establishment, felt threatened by and opposed these far-
reaching reforms, many of which ran counter to deeply held Afghan
traditions.7" In implementing the reforms, the P.D.P.A. made no
effort to engage traditional social and economic structures. Rather,
"reforms were accompanied by fascist attempts to stifle indigenous
opposition,"71 and the regime "carried out massive repression,
63. Id.
64. See MAcEACHIN, supra note 59, at 6-8.
65. KAKAR, supra note 41, at 257-300.
66. Id.
67. MAGNUS & NABY, supra note 5, at 122.
68. In 1983, four years after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, in an address
to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Konstantin
Chernenko likened the U.S.S.R.'s "ideological work" to an orchestra, whereby "harmony is
achieved by skillful conducting." Chernenko stated:
Comrades, our entire system of ideological work should operate as a well-
arranged orchestra in which every instrument has a distinctive voice and leads
its theme, while harmony is achieved by skillful conducting. The main demands
on Party leadership of ideological work are constantly to check the tone of
propaganda against our policy goals and people's interest, and to ensure that
word becomes deed, as Lenin put it. Propaganda is called upon to embrace
every aspect of social life and every social group and region and to reach every
individual.
EDWARD F. DANDAR, JR., THE NAT'L WAR COLLEGE NATL DEF. UNIV. STRATEGIC STUDY,
SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES: IMPACT ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING 16 (1985),
available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/n3/SSP-85-055b.pdf.
69. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR: INTIMIDATION AND ATTACKS
AGAINST WOMEN IN PUBLIC LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN 5 (2004), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/
afghanistanl004/index.htm [hereinafter BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR].
70. See Kolhatkar, supra note 42, at 14.
71. Id. at 15.
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including systematic torture of thousands of detainees by the secret
police.., and indiscriminate bombing of rural areas. 72 Tragically,
this violence undermined the regime and fueled opposition to its
reforms, particularly the expansion of women's rights.73
Fearing that a communist state was slipping out of its orbit,
the P.D.P.A.'s powerful sponsor acted as it had in Hungary in 1956
and Czechoslovakia in 1968."4 In 1979, the Soviet Union had
thousands of troops on the ground, and on December 24, large
numbers of airborne forces joined them to surround the presidential
palace.7" Babrak Karmal, who arrived atop a Soviet tank,76 was
installed as Prime Minister.77 Three days later, massive Soviet
ground forces invaded from the north.7' By the spring of 1980, more
than 100,000 Soviet troops were present in Afghanistan.79
In April 1979, six months before the Soviet invasion, seven
Afghan groups based in Pakistan began meeting with and receiving
weapons80 and assistance from CIA officials.81 These groups had
previously declared ajihad, or holy war, against the P.D.P.A. regime,
and now expanded their jihad to include the Soviet invaders.8 2
Consequently, their combatants came to be known as Mujahidin. 3
The CIA apparently reasoned that the Mujahidin were worthy of
material and financial support as they were the most anti-communist
group in Afghanistan. The fact that they were also the most anti-
Western group apparently did not matter; nor did the group's utter
disregard for women deter the CIA from withholding support.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the notorious Afghan warlord who received
the lion's share of the CIA's bounty during the early years of the war,
first gained notoriety in Kabul for spraying acid onto the faces of
72. Id.
73. Id. at 15.
74. See generally ADAM ULAM, THE COMMUNIsTS: THE STORY OF POWER AND LOST
ILLUSIONS, 1948-1991 (1992).
75. BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN, supra note 44.
76. MAGNUS & NABY, supra note 5, at 129.
77. BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN, supra note 44.
78. Id.
79. GOODSON, supra note 2, at 59.
80. "Until 1986, the Americans were careful not to supply [the Mujahidin with] their own
arms, but bought Soviet-made weapons from Egypt, Israel, and elsewhere, and sent them in
through Pakistan.... The Chinese also supplied arms while other countries, notably Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States, contributed financially." EWANS, supra note 23, at 161.
81. WILLIAM BLUM, KILLING HOPE: U.S. MILITARYAND CIA INTERVENTIONS SINCE WORLD
WAR II 344 (1995); GOODSON, supra note 2, at 146-47 (estimating that U.S. aid to the
Mujahidin totaled approximately $3 billion in the 1980s); Kolhatkar, supra note 42, at 153.
82. EWANS, supra note 23, at 54, 153.
83. Id. at 153.
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young girls who went about unveiled.' "Even the CIA admitted to his
'vicious' and 'fascist' tendencies." 5 Apparently, in the grand scheme
of the Cold War, the fate of a tiny nation like Afghanistan simply
did not matter. Indeed, as President Carter's National Security
Advisor, Zbignew Brzezinski, explained to a French journalist in 1998
when asked whether he regretted supporting the Mujahidin and
giving arms and advice to future terrorists, "[w]hat is more important
to the history of the world .... the Taliban or the collapse of the
Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central
Europe and the end of the cold war?" 6
Although the Soviet Union had superior weapons and complete
air control, the Mujahidin, armed with the deadly American Stinger
anti-aircraft missiles, proved a formidable foe. 87 By the mid-1980s
the conflict had settled into a bloody stalemate, with the Afghan
people caught in the middle. In an insightful review of M. Hassan
Kakar's Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response,
1979-1982, one author explains how the Soviets attempted to deal
with their unconventional foes:
Under these circumstances, the Soviets tried what most states
faced with popular guerillas attempt: they took the war to the
civilians and the countryside. The basic method . . . is to
depopulate remote, ill-controlled villages. Whether the villagers
go to towns and villages you control, or to concentration camps,
or flee the country, or simply die, is at best a secondary
issue .... The Soviets prosecuted this strategy with remarkable
thoroughness. Before the war, the Afghan population is estimated
to have been somewhat more than fifteen million people. Over five
million - a third'of the country - became refugees .... Millions
more became refugees within the country, swelling the population
of Kabul. Another million people were killed, either in fighting, or
in massacres by Soviet troops or by sheer starvation ... In a
display of really macabre ingenuity, the Soviets took to scattering
84. Kolhatkar, supra note 42, at 15.
85. Id.
86. JANETTE RAINWATER, TERRORISM AND BLOWRACK, PART TWO: 'TERRORISM," BLOWBACK
AND US FOREIGN POLICY, 1953-1992, http://www.janrainwater.com/htdocs2.htm.
87. As one author has written:
It was Stingers, not cross-border operations, that made the difference. The Muj
brought down their first Soviet helicopter with a Stinger in September 1986,
and over the following ten months nearly 190 of the lethal missiles were fired
by the rebels with an astonishing 75 percent kill rate. That was the beginning
of the end for the Soviets.
THOMAS POWERS, INTELLIGENCE WARS: AMERICAN SECRET HISTORY FROM HITLER TO AL-
QAEDA 287 (2002). See also Ken Silverstein, Stingers, Stingers, Who's Got the Stingers?,
SLATE, Oct. 2, 2001, http://slate.msn.com/id/116582.
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brightly-colored plastic toys, which exploded when picked up by
children.'
The Soviets also left some ten million landmines in their wake.8 9
These landmines continue to restrict areas for cultivation, slow the
return of refugees, and maim and kill innocent Afghans. In 2000, an
average of approximately eighty-eight casualties per month were
attributed to landmines and other unexploded ordinances.9 °
By the late 1980s, a growing Soviet-American rapprochement,
due in large measure to efforts by the new Soviet premier Gorbachev,
increased pressure for a settlement. 91 In 1988, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
the United States, and the Soviet Union signed the Geneva Accords.92
The Accords called for American and Soviet "noninterference in the
internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the right of refugees to
return to Afghanistan without fear of persecution," and a timetable
to ensure full Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan on or before
February 15, 1989. 9 Tragically, the Mujahidin were not a party to
the Accords and refused to accept their terms. 94 As a result, on
February 15, 1989, when the last Soviet soldier crossed the Amu
Darya River bridge, the Mujahidin, still receiving funding from
the United States, continued their attack against the government
by shelling the major cities, killing thousands of civilians in the
process.95
On April 29, 1992, the Mujahidin factions marched upon Kabul
and declared themselves leaders of war-weary Afghanistan.96 Two
months later, Tajik leader Barnahuddin Rabbani declared himself
President.97
I was ecstatic that the fighting had at long last come to an end.
Moreover, I was eager to get on with my legal career. Though I had
completed all the required course work, my degree from the Judi-
ciary Training program had yet to be granted, for the Communists
would only accept female judges who were party members; a
88. Shalizi, supra note 52.
89. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LANDMINE MONITOR REP. 2001: AFGHANISTAN
(2001), available at http://www.icbl.org/m/2001/afghanistan [hereinafter LANDMINEMONITOR].
90. See id.
91. BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN, supra note 44.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. RAINWATER, supra note 86.
96. See Edward A. Gargan, Afghanistan: Healing a Broken Land, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1992, at A10.
97. See MICHAEL GRIFFIN, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT IN
AFGHANISTAN 24 (2001).
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condition I was unwilling to meet. Despite the concerns that most
women, and I, had about the new government, we could not help but
think Afghanistan's nightmare was at long last over. After all, how
could anything be worse than what we had endured the past ten
years?
III. THE TALIBAN: 98 JOURNEY INTO THE WHIRLWIND 99
It took the Mujahidin little time to prove that although they
could win the war, they could not secure the peace. Without a
common enemy, the various militias' ethnic differences and greed
surfaced and a new war emerged. 00 In what was an ironic twist in
Afghanistan's tragic history, "Kabul, which had survived the first
... stages of the war relatively unscathed, became a major battle-
ground."' 1 As many as 50,000 people were killed, 150,000 were
wounded, and hundreds of thousands were made homeless following
the Soviet withdrawal.0 2 Forces loyal to guerrilla leader Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar immediately launched attacks against Kabul, and shell-
ings rained down on the capital, which had largely been spared the
fighting of the past decade."0 3 In time, every major Mujahidin faction
joined in the fighting and Afghanistan became a series of medieval
fiefdoms, each controlled by a powerful warlord in the business of
making war. 10
This continuous violence particularly frustrated Pakistan, as
it prevented Afghanistan's powerful neighbor to the east from
98. Several recent sources attempt to explain the Taliban's rise to power and its perverse
fundamentalism. See generally FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN?: AFGHANISTANAND THE TALIBAN
(William Maley ed., 1998); MICHAEL GRIFFIN, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE TALIBAN
MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN (2001); ROBERT D. KAPLAN, SOLDIERS OF GOD: WITH ISLAMIC
WARRIORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (2001); PETER MARSDEN, THE TALIBAN: WAR,
RELIGIONAND THE NEW ORDER INAFGHANISTAN (1998); NEAMATOLLAH NOJUMI, THE RISE OF
THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN: MASS MOBILIZATION, CIVIL WAR, AND THE FUTURE OF THE
REGION (2002); AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN
CENTRAL ASIA (2000); SHAY SHAUL, ENDLESS JIHAD: THE MUJAHIDIN, THE TALIBAN AND BIN
LADIN (2002).
99. The subtitle refers to the remarkable and inspirational autobiography of Eugenia
Semyonova Ginzburg, a victim of Stalin's reign of terror. EUGENIA SEMYONOVA GINZBURG,
JOURNEY INTO THE WHIRLWIND (Paul Stevenson & Max Hayward trans., 1967). The author,
a Communist supporter, found herself wrongfully accused of being an enemy of the people
and subsequently spent eighteen years in Russia's prison and labor camps. Id.
100. See EWANS, supra note 23, at 179.
101. GOODSON, supra note 2, at 74-75. See also Carlotta Gall, From the Rubble: A City of
Old? Or All Shiny and New?, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A4.
102. GOODSON, supra note 2, at 75.
103. See id. at 74.
104. See id. at 74-76.
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realizing its aspirations to trade with and influence Central Asia. 105
Pakistani and Saudi Arabian fundamentalists extended support to
a new movement, known as the Taliban or religious students, in the
summer of 1994.106 The Taliban were composed of Pushtun refugees
and war veterans from rural Pakistani and Afghan madrasahs, or
Islamic schools.'I 7 As one scholar has written, "[t] heir arrival on the
Afghan stage marked the end of the period of intra-mujahideen civil
war and the beginning of [the next] stage in the Afghan War." '
Their arrival also marked a new stage of terror for Afghan women.
Not surprisingly, just as the Mujahidin had disintegrated into
warring factions once deprived of a common enemy, they now put
aside their differences, renamed themselves the Northern Alliance,
and took up arms against the Taliban. °9 War continued. Although
fighting continued in Northern Afghanistan until the 2001 invasion
by the Americans, the Taliban controlled two-thirds of the country
by the end of 1996.11° By the time of the American invasion, the
Taliban effectively controlled ninety percent of the country and was
indisputably the de facto ruler."' The Taliban consisted of a six-
member ruling council in Kabul." 2 Ultimate authority, however,
rested with the reclusive Mullah Omar and the Taliban's inner
shura, or council, located in Kandahar."' The Northern Alliance, led
by President Rabbani, held a sliver of territory in the northeast.
1 1 4
To understand the Taliban, one must understand the forces
that created them. Ratna Kapur describes the Taliban as "a force
born in the crucible of the Cold War, schooled in the Madrasas and
whose members were raised in refugee camps.""' Similarly,
Arundhati Roy, the Booker Prize-winning author from India,
explains:
105. Id. at 76.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Kolhatkar, supra note 42, at 18.
110. See id.
111. See BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN, supra note 44.
112. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the
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EICN.4/2000/6/Add.4 (Mar. 13, 2000) (prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/do/UNDOC/GEN/GOO/115/81/PDF/GOO11581.pdf?OpenElement
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113. See id.
114. Anthony Davis, How the Taliban Became a Military Force, in FUNDAMENTALISM
REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN 67-68 (William Maley ed., 2001).
115. Ratna Kapur, Un-Veiling Women's Rights in the War on Terrorism,' 9 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 211, 220 (2002).
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Young boys many of them orphans - who grew up in those
times, had guns for toys, never knew the security and comfort of
family life, never experienced the company of women. Now, as
adults and rulers, the Taliban beat, stone, rape and brutalise
women, they don't seem to know what else to do with them.
Years of war has [sic] stripped them of gentleness, inured them
to kindness and human compassion. Now they've turned their
monstrosity on their own people. 1
16
Following a twenty-two month siege, on September 27, 1966,
these men "born in the crucible of the Cold War"'17 and "inured...
to kindness and human compassion""11 swept into Kabul and de-
clared themselves the legitimate government of the newly named
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.'19 Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the
United Arab Emirates rushed to recognize the new government. 20
Proving they would not hesitate to settle scores from the past, one
of the Taliban's first acts was to capture former Communist
President Najibullah, who had ruled Afghanistan from 1986 to
1992; they tortured and killed him before hanging his body in a
public square. 12' The Taliban takeover of Kabul did have one
positive aspect: it ended the blockade of the city by the Taliban;
both food and other items of trade could now reach Kabul. 22 The
effects, however, were limited. The constant devaluation of the
currency resulted in steadily rising prices, placing most goods out
of the reach of most residents despite their increased availability. 1
23
The horrors of Taliban rule have been well documented.124 Yet
mere words will never convey the horror and brutality that engulfed
Afghanistan. In a 2000 report on violence against women, the
United Nations Economic and Social Council Special Rapporteur
explained:
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TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at Al.
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Most countries of the world appear to tolerate some practices
that discriminate against women, but in only some countries is
discrimination official policy. In Taliban controlled areas of
Afghanistan, discrimination against women is officially sanc-
tioned and pervades every aspect of the lives of women. They
are subject to grave indignities in the areas of physical security
and the rights to education, health, freedom of movement and
freedom of association.125
Hours after the Taliban took Kabul, orders from the High
Council were announced over Radio Kabul'26 instructing women to
stop attending workplaces, prohibiting girls from attending school,
and commanding that women only move outside the home when
accompanied by a male family member and wearing a burqa.'27 A
burqa is a head-to-toe black pleated garment that completely covers
a woman's body. Over the eyes there is a three-inch mesh square to
permit what is, at best, minimal vision.
I had never worn a burqa before and I despised it so much I
wore it in my dreams. Wearing the burqa I felt imprisoned, both
literally and figuratively. In the summer it was so hot that I felt as
though I were slowly suffocating. Peering out of that tiny mesh cage,
Ifelt like a caged animal, which is exactly what Iand other women
had become: caged animals stripped of any freedom or dignity.
Overnight, half of the population of Afghanistan disappeared.
Women who had once been teachers, lawyers, engineers, and
doctors became ghosts, locked in their homes behind painted black
windows.12 As the war had created a large number of widows, the
inability of these women to work caused enormous hardship.
Overnight, educated, confident women who had once provided for
their families and benefitted society were reduced to selling all
their worldly possessions, begging in the street for food, or selling
themselves.'29 In Kabul alone, over 150,000 women were barred
125. Id. at 5.
126. Radio Kabul was renamed Radio Shariat in October 1996. Nancy Hatch Dupree,
Afghan Women Under the Taliban, in FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE
TALIBAN 148 n.11 (William Maley ed., 2001).
127. Id. at 148. See also CHRISTINA LAMB, THE SEWING CIRCLES OF HERAT 30 (2002).
128. The Taliban ordered that houses with female occupants have their windows painted
over so that women in the homes could not be visible from the street. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY REPORT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998 (1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/globa
human_rights/1998_hrp-report/afghanis.html [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1998].
129. See John F. Burns, Kabul's Islamic Rulers Face Rivals' Guns and Growing Popular
Discontent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A14.
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from working, 30,000 of whom were war widows. 13° As an Amnesty
International Report in 1996 concluded, "the Taliban has thus
deliberately created such poverty by arbitrarily depriving half the
population under its control of jobs, schooling, mobility, and health
care. Such restrictions were literally life threatening to women and
to their children."'31 These conditions led many women to suicide;
indeed, a 1998 survey by Physicians for Human Rights indicated
that an astonishing 97% of Afghan women exhibited signs of major
depression and 21% reported having suicidal ideations "extremely
often" or quite often. 132
Members of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and
Suppression of Vice, known as the "religious police," were responsible
for enforcing the Taliban's misanthropic edicts. 133 The Ministry
terrorized women. They had the power to impose on-the-spot punish-
ments, including beatings or imprisonment for "perceived" violations
without any due process.13 1 "The religious police specifically hit
women on private parts of the body, for example the breasts, in the
knowledge that women were less likely to show the bruising, even to
family members.' 35
After seventeen years of war, thousands of women had lost their
husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers in the fighting and had to
choose between virtual house arrest or risking a public beating and
imprisonment.136 One woman in the city of Farah was shot by the
Taliban for taking her toddler, who was suffering from acute
diarrhea, to a doctor without a male escort. 1 7 Even with the proper
male guardian, women were beaten if they made noises when they
walked, if they laughed, if they wore white shoes or socks, or if an
inch of their ankle showed under their burqa.138 One "elderly woman
was brutally beaten with a metal cable until her leg was broken
because her ankle was accidentally showing from underneath her
130. Id.
131. AMNESTY INT'L, AFGHANISTAN: GRAVE ABUSES BY THE TALIBAN IN THE NAME OF
RELIGION (1996), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA110131996
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132. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998, supra note 128.
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137. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, WOMEN AND GIRLS IN AFGHANISTAN: FACT SHEET RELEASED BY
THE SENIOR COORDINATOR FOR INT'L WOMEN'S ISSUES (1998), http://www.state.
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[burqa].""' In another instance, "a woman struggling with two small
children and groceries in her arms was reportedly beaten by Taliban
with a car antenna because she had let her face covering slip a
fraction."14 Other women could not afford the nine dollar burqa and
thus could not leave their homes. In one instance a "mother watched
her daughter writhe with stomach pain for days. But she did not take
her to a free clinic because she could not afford [the burqa].... The
[twenty-two]-year old daughter died." '141 In addition to public
beatings, women who violated standards of morality were publicly
lashed in front of large crowds, often in a stadium.142 Women found
guilty of adultery could be stoned to death.4
Under Taliban rule, an already inadequate health care system
deteriorated precipitously so that countless women died of treatable
illnesses.'44 Initially, like other women, female medical practitio-
ners were banned from work.'45 Nonetheless, as male doctors were
severely limited in their ability to treat female patients, 146 this
policy proved untenable, and the resulting international uproar
forced the Taliban to modify it. 14' Female doctors and nurses were
allowed to resume their jobs in Kabul and elsewhere, but generally
under strict guidelines. '48 Beginning in September 1997, female
medical patients were segregated into different hospitals.'49 As an
article in Human Rights Brief noted, "[a]ll female hospital person-
nel, including physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and technicians,
were prohibited from working in the twenty-two hospitals in Kabul.
The single medical facility where women were permitted contained
only thirty-five patient beds. Clean water, electricity, oxygen, and
surgical and diagnostic equipment were not available." 5 '
In the field of health care, of particular concern was women's
reproductive health. Stephanie Dubitsky explained:
139. Friedman, supra note 3, at 91.
140. WOMEN AND GIRLS IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 137.
141. Friedman, supra note 3, at 91.
142. Violence Against Women, supra note 112, at 7.
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Even before the Taliban took power, Afghanistan's incidence of
maternal mortality was one of the worst in the world .... Only
a few female obstetricians.., allowed to work under the rules
negotiated by the International Red Cross . . . practic[ed] in
Afghanistan, and male obstetricians [we]re prevented from
adequately treating their patients due to the restrictions on
male-female contact. The United Nations estimate[d] that, as a
result, only ten percent of Afghan women ha[d] access to formal
prenatal and maternal medical services, and medically-trained
health care providers attend[ed] fewer than six percent of all
births.15'
Another Taliban edict with deleterious health consequences
banned women and girls from using Kabul's thirty-two public bath-
houses.'52 Bathhouses had always been segregated by sex and were
often the only place where women could bathe in warm water.'53 As
a result of the ban, incidents of gynecological infections, scabies,
and uterine infection after childbirth increased.' Women were not
the only ones to suffer a reduction in health care. Prior to Taliban
rule, forty percent of the doctors in Kabul were women. 5 The loss
of such a significant portion of the medical profession caused some
hospitals and treatment centers to close, affecting men as well. 5 '
Taliban edicts banning images of humans157 "caused the destruction
of public education posters (representing the human body) and
hampered the ... dissemination of health information,"'58 a particu-
lar concern in a largely illiterate society such as Afghanistan.'59
In the field of primary education, the ban on female employ-
ment harmed all children. A U.N. survey conducted in May 1996
indicated that prior to the Taliban "Kabul had 158 pubic schools,
151. Id.
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accommodating 148,223 boys and 103,256 girls, taught by 11,208
teachers of whom 7,793 were women."'6 ° Overnight, Kabul lost over
70% of its teachers, causing many schools to shut down. Secondary
education was equally impacted; prior to the Taliban, 60% of the
professors at Kabul University had been women.
161
As a result of pressure from the international community, the
Taliban made insignificant changes to the policy prohibiting girls
from attending school. 16 2 In 1997 it opened schools for girls aged six
to ten.'63 The schools, however, were run by the Ministry of
Religious Affairs rather than the Ministry of Education and the
main curriculum was the Qur'an. "'6 4 The Taliban's educational
edicts stemmed from its fear that "girls w[ould] be corrupted by
anything other than a pure Islamic teaching, consistent with the
Taliban interpretation of Islam . ... ,,165 The policies were clear
violations of international law. The Special Rapporteur on violence
against women noted:
The Taliban's lack of official commitment to educating girl
children is a violation of international law and Afghanistan's
commitments under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child.'66
For me, hiding in the house behind painted windows, wasting
away, while my fellow countrywomen endured injustices was not an
option. To do so would be to strengthen a regime I despised with all
my heart. I equated silence with acquiescence and believed as Dante
had written in The Inferno almost seven-hundred years earlier: "The
hottest places in Hell are reserved for those who, in time of moral
crises, maintain their neutrality."'67 I decided the best way I could
serve my country was to become an underground educator. I began
running a secret school teaching women and girls to read and write.
I wanted to prepare them for the day that I knew was sure to come.
In the time I conducted my secret school, I had between 350-400
students. The youngest was eight years old, the oldest fifty. Whenever
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informers got close, I would move the school to a different house.
Within a short time I learned to distinguish who was at the door: my
students and a few other teachers assisting me would knock with
their palms open while the Taliban would bang at the door with the
butts of their rifles. I never lost sight of the danger involved in
conducting the school. In one instance, another "woman who [had]
defied Taliban orders by running a home school for girls was shot
and killed in front of her family and friends. 6 Although my time
as an underground educator was incredibly rewarding, it took an
enormous toll on me. In the final days of rule under the Taliban, I
fled to Pakistan, where I met various inter-governmental and non-
governmental organizations dedicated to helping my country.
The misogyny of the Taliban was matched by the world's indif-
ference. Had the United States and the international community
confronted the Taliban five years earlier than it did, both the
horrors of life under the Taliban and the deplorable events of
September 11, 2001 may have been averted. Tragically, both the
United States and the international community chose to look the
other way.
On November 18, 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
visited a group of Afghan children in a mud-walled school at an
Afghan refugee camp in Nasir Bagh, Pakistan.169 Visibly moved,
Albright listened intently as schoolgirls and their teachers re-
counted, often in horrifying detail, their flight from the Taliban.
171
Before departing, she told the group, "I will do everything I can to
help your country... I can visit you again, but in Afghanistan,
where you will live as full equals.... We really are all sisters."'7 ' At
a news conference in front of embarrassed Pakistani officials the
following day, Albright used the strongest language yet by a public
official in denouncing the Taliban: "I think it is very clear that we
are opposed to the Taliban because of their approach to human
rights, their despicable treatment of women and children, and their
lack of respect for human dignity."'72 Albright's words were strong,
but regrettably, the deeds never matched the words. Eighteen
months after Albright's remarks, on July 4, 1999, President Clinton
168. FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., STOP GENDER APARTHEID (2005), http://www. feminist.
org /afghan/facts.html.
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issued Executive Order 13,129, which froze assets and prohibited
transactions with the Taliban.'73 The Order, however, was prompted
not by the Taliban's treatment of women, but by security concerns.'74
Given Albright's promises to her Afghan "sisters" it is quite extra-
ordinary that nowhere in the Order was the abysmal treatment of
women under the Taliban mentioned. Rather, the Order was entirely
premised upon what the United States deemed to be a threat to its
national security:
The actions and policies of the Taliban in Afghanistan, in
allowing territory under its control in Afghanistan to be used as
a safe haven and base of operations for Usama bin Ladin and
the Al-Qaida organization who have committed and threaten to
continue to commit acts of violence against the United States
and its nationals, constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with
that threat.'7 5
Even more extraordinary, just three months later, following a
meeting between Taliban representative Abdul Hakeem Mujahid
and Assistant Secretary of State Karl F. Inderfurth, Albright
suggested that "the ruling militia ha[ve] a chance at being accorded
regular treatment by nations around the world if [they] let go of bin
Ladin."'16 The United States suspected that bin Ladin (who had
helped finance the Taliban seizure of Kabul) had masterminded the
bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania the
summer before.' 7 7 Whether Albright was in fact promising normal
relations with the Taliban in exchange for expelling bin Ladin is
unclear; what is clear is that the United States was willing to
abandon its Afghan "sisters" for bin Ladin.
The United Nations' actions were equally reprehensible. In a
perspicacious article examining the United Nations' role in Taliban
controlled Afghanistan, Guglielmo Verdirame concludes, "the UN
... failed to prevent and, later, to become an effective opponent of
173. Exec. Order No. 13,129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,759 (July 7, 1999).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Afghanistan's Ruling Taliban Hints at Interest in U.S. Offer; Deal is Based on
Expulsion of Bin Ladin to Face Terrorism Charges, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 26, 1999,
at A3.
177. See U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan, CNN.COM, Aug. 20, 1998,
http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.01. Following the attacks, the Clinton adminis-
tration fired Tomahawk cruise missiles at a terrorist training complex run by bin Ladin in
eastern Afghanistan near the Pakistani border, killing twenty-one and wounding thirty. Id.
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the gender policies of the Taliban regime . . .. "1" Verdirame is
particularly critical of the United Nations Security Council.179
As was the case with the United States issuance of Executive
Order 13,129, when the Security Council decided to use its powers
pursuant to Chapter VIP 8 in S.C. Res. 1267,181 the primary reason
for doing so "was the alleged support of the Taliban to terrorist
activities and their refusal to surrender Usama bin Ladin to the
U.S."1"2 To its credit, S.C. Res. 1267 did reiterate the Security
Council's "deep concern over the continuing violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law and of human rights, particularly discrimi-
nation against women and girls . "183 Yet, Verdirame notes:
It is quite likely that.., were the Taliban not accused of offering
sanctuary to terrorist organizations, the Security Council would
have altogether abstained from intervening in Afghanistan,
since the persecution of women is arguably not perceived as
likely to endanger peace, let alone to constitute a threat of the
peace or breach of the peace.184
Nevertheless, scholars have argued that in the 1990s "[a]n
important trend ha[d] developed . . . signaling an even greater
involvement of the Council in human rights and humanitarian
matters, often characterized by interventions under Chapter VII."'1 5
Indeed, in the 1990s, "threats to the peace" were expanded to situ-
ations of restoration of democracy (Haiti);8 6 serious humanitarian
178. Verdirame, supra note 4, at 735.
179. Id. at 747-55.
180. Under Chapter Six of the United Nations Charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes,"
the Security Council "may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute .... U.N. Charter art. 34. The Council may
"recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" if it determines that the
situation is likely to endanger international peace and security. U.N. Charter arts. 33, 36.
These recommendations are not binding on U.N. members. Under Chapter Seven, "Action
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," the
Council has broader power to decide what measures are to be taken in situations involving
"any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." U.N. Charter art. 39. In
such situations, the Council is not limited to recommendations but may take action,
including the use of armed force "to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Id. See also Niels Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized?: Powers and Practice of the UN
Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by 'Coalitions of the Able and Willing,' 11 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 541 (2000), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Voll1/No3/110541.pdf.
181. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N.SCOR, 4051st mtg., 15 Oct. 1999, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
182. Verdirame, supra note 4, at 748.
183. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N.SCOR, 4051st mtg., 15 Oct. 1999, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
184. Verdirame, supra note 4, at 752.
185. Id. at 750-51.
186. S.C. Res. 875, U.N.SCOR, 3293rd mtg., 16 Oct. 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/875 (1993).
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crises (Zaire,"7 Kosovo,18 8 and Somalia);" 9 restoration of internal
peace and security (East Timor 9 ° and Albania);191 and genocide
(Rwanda).'92 As Verdirame concludes upon surveying this expansion
of Chapter VII actions, "the explicit determination under Article 39
that the systematic discrimination and persecution of women in
Afghanistan constitutes a threat of the peace could have been made
by the Council."'93 Yet it never was. Verdirame offers one explan-
ation: "[t]he Security Council ... does no more than reflect existing
value systems of the international community, and it is exactly this
intrinsic flaw that makes the intervention of the Council in questions
related to the discrimination of women inevitably less vigorous than
in other cases."'9 The horrific plight of women in Afghanistan appar-
ently did not rate high enough in the "value systems" of the United
States and the international community: they were content to ignore
the whirlwind that was ravaging Afghanistan. That changed on
September 11, 2001.
IV. THE AMERICANS: TURNING IN A WIDENING GYRE IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM
Within twenty-four hours of the horrific attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States was ascribing
the tragedy to bin Laden, the Taliban's multimillionaire ally.
Shortly after the attack, a spokesman for the Taliban's supreme
leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, issued a denial stating "Mullah
Omar condemns this act. Mullah Omar says Osama is not respon-
sible. We have brought peace to this country and we want peace in
all countries."'95 Notwithstanding this and other prevarications, the
United States wasted little "time in launching an extensive ...
bombing campaign against Afghanistan," with reports of civilian
deaths ranging from 1,000 to 4,000.196 Unlike past policy pronounce-
ments, and although certainly ancillary to exacting a reprisal
187. S.C. Res. 1080, U.N.SCOR, 3713th mtg., 15 Nov. 1996, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1080 (1996).
188. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N.SCOR, 3937th mtg., 24 Oct. 1998, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
189. S.C. Res. 794, U.N.SCOR, 3145th mtg., 3 Dec. 1992, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
190. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N.SCOR, 4045th mtg., 15 Sept. 1999, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999).
191. S.C. Res. 1114, U.N.SCOR, 3791st mtg., 19 June 1997, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1114 (1997).
192. S.C. Res. 929, U.N.SCOR, 3392st mtg., 22 June 1994, U.N. Doc. SJRES/929 (1994).
193. Verdirame, supra note 4, at 751-54.
194. Id. at 753.
195. Barry Bearak, The Afghans Condemning Attacks, Taliban Says bin Laden Not
Involved, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A22.
196. Kolhatkar, supra note 42, at 19-20.
2005] UNDER A CRUEL SUN 229
which had killed some 3,000 Americans, President George W. Bush
continuously gave the plight of women under the Taliban as one
justification for removing the regime.'97 The United States easily
won the war.198
The same month the United States declared that Al Qaeda had
been routed from Afghanistan, representatives of a motley assortment
of Afghan factions'99 "met in Bonn, Germany, under the auspices of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan
to map out Afghanistan's future."2 °0 On December 5, 2001, the Bonn
Agreement 20' was signed.20 2 Though not a comprehensive peace
agreement, the Agreement set out a schematic roadmap and timetable
for establishing peace and security, reconstructing the country,
rebuilding civil society, and protecting human rights.20 3 Under the
Bonn Agreement, in June 2002, the Emergency Loya Jirga (grand
council) convened to institute a two-year transitional government and
selected Hamid Karzai to serve as President of Afghanistan.
20 4
'Women comprised approximately twelve percent of the Emergency
197. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Jan. 29, 2002 State of the Union Address
(transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/
index.html). President Bush noted that four months prior to the American invasion, "the
mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from
working or going to school. Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan's new
government." Id. Since Sept. 11, President Bush has "repeatedly pledged [the United States']
commitment to Afghan women and made the case strongly in his June 2002 commencement
speech at West Point: '[a] thriving nation will respect the rights of women, because no society
can prosper while denying opportunity to half its citizens."' Jennifer Seymour Whitaker,
Women at Risk in Afghanistan, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 2002, at A15.
198. Pockets of Taliban and al Qaeda resistance remain in Afghanistan as of this writing.
In June 2005 an American Chinook helicopter carrying seventeen American troops, including
Navy SEALs and Army Special Forces, crashed after coming under hostile fire. Halima
Kazem, Helicopter Crash Rescue Bid Persists Despite Obstacles, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2005,
at A4.
199. Representatives included Mujahidin forces who had fought against the Taliban,
representatives of the former King Zahir Shah, and representatives of various other exiled
Afghan groups. BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR, supra note 69, at 8. To the surprise of many, albeit
with a good deal of pressure from the United States, the former enemies agreed to the
general provisions of the Agreement. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AFGHANISTAN'S BONN
AGREEMENT ONE YEAR LATER: A CATALOG OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES (2002), http://www.hrw.
orglbackgrounder/asia/afghanistan/bonnlyr-bck.htm [hereinafter AFGHANISTAN'S BONN
AGREEMENT].
200. AFGHANISTAN'S BONN AGREEMENT, supra note 199.
201. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablish-
ment of Permanent Government Institutions (2001), available at http://www.afghangovern
ment.comlAfghanAgreementBonn.htm [hereinafter Provisional Agreement].
202. AFGHANISTAN'S BONN AGREEMENT, supra note 199.
203. Id.
204. BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR, supra note 69, at 8.
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Loya Jirga delegates., 20 ' The person to win the second-most number
of votes, 171 to Karzai's 1,295, was Massouda Jalal, a woman,
physician, and U.N. staff member, who remained in the race despite
great pressure to withdraw.2"6 Also under the Bonn Agreement, a
"Constitutional Loya Jirga was then convened in December 2003 to
approve a new constitution and government structure. 2 7
Prior to the constitutional convention in December 2003, a
constitutional commission met for months of discussion and con-
sultations.0 8 In conducting its work, the Commission was keenly
aware of the importance of a legitimate constitution supported by
the people. As one member explained, "[t]he crisis of Afghanistan
has its roots in illegitimate power. We must have legitimacy and
responsibility., 2 9 Consequently, members traveled around the
country holding public meetings and sent out nearly half a million
questionnaires, asking people what principles they believed should
guide the country, "what rights should be guaranteed and what
system of government they wanted. '210 The Commission "received
100,000 questionnaires, 10,000 written opinions and 300 cassettes
of ideas recorded by illiterate people ....211
On January 4, 2004, Afghanistan's Constitutional Loya Jirga
approved a 162-article constitution.2 2 The Constitution establishes
a presidential system of government with a bicameral legislature.2 3
The president acts as both head of state and head of government
and is directly elected to a maximum of two five-year terms.21 4 The
lower house of the National Assembly, Wolesi Jirga (House of
People) is to be comprised of a maximum of 250 persons directly
elected to five-year terms.21' The upper house, Meshrano Jirga,
(House of Elders) is made up of representatives from provincial and
205. Id. "Approximately 1,600 delegates participated in the Emergency Loya Jirga. One
hundred and sixty seats were reserved for women, and overall, some two hundred women
delegates were either elected or appointed." Id. at 9 n. 16.
206. Id. at 9.
207. Id. at 8-9.
208. Carlotta Gall, New Afghan Constitution Juggles Koran and Democracy, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2003, at A3.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. CONST. OFTHE IsLAMIc REPUBLIC OFAFGHANISTAN (adopted by the Loya Jirga on Jan.
4, 2004), available at http://www.afghanland.com/history/constitution.html.
213. Id. at arts. LX, LXXXII.
214. Id. at arts. LX, LXII.
215. Id. at arts. LXXXII-LXXXIII.
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district councils, as well as presidential appointees.216 The former
king will continue to hold the symbolic title of "Father of the
Nation," but there will be no return to the monarchy.21 v The country
is to be governed by civil laws, provided they are in keeping with
Islam.21s
The 2004 Constitution contains specific provisions guaranteeing
women's rights. Article XXII affirms that "[t]he citizens of Afghani-
stan - whether woman or man - have equal rights and duties
before the law. 2 9 Recognizing the injustices of the past in the field
of education, article XVIV states that "[t]he state shall devise and
implement effective programs for balancing and promoting education
for women, improving of education . . . and the elimination of
illiteracy in the country."22 The Constitution also guarantees women
two seats from each province, on average, in the House of People.221
According to Peace Watch, a publication by the United States
Institute of Peace, the 2004 Constitution is the "most liberal constitu-
tion in the region stretching from Syria to Pakistan."'222
Ten months after Afghanistan's Constitution was approved, with
the help of the U.N., on October 9, 2004, after twenty years of war,
Afghans went to the polls for the first time to elect a president.223
Despite fears of intimidation and violence by Taliban members and
local warlords, over ten million Afghans "bravely turned out to affirm
their faith in a democratic future. 224 While there were no successful
large-scale attacks against voters or polling places the process was
marred by sloppy technical and organizational problems. 2 5 In the
weeks prior to the election, the number of registered voters came to
exceed the estimated number of eligible voters.22 In order to prevent
216. Id. at arts. LXXXII-LXXXJV.
217. Id. at arts. CLVIII.
218. Article III states, "In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and
provisions of the sacred religion of Islam." Id. at art. III.
219. Id. at art. XXII.
220. Id. at art. XLIV.
221. Id. at art. LXXXIII.
222. Institute of Peace, Afghanistan's Constitution, 10 PEACE WATCH ONLINE 2 (2004),
http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2004/6/afghanistan1.html.
223. Afghanistan Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A24. Parliamentary and municipal
elections are tentatively scheduled for September 2005. See Robert Birsel, Afghan Vote Plans
Said on Track Despite Worries, AFG. NEWS NET (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.afghan
news.net/index.php?action=show&type=news&id=3205.
224. Afghanistan Votes, supra note 223.
225. Douglas Birch, Calm, Distrust Mark Historic Vote; Karzai Foes Suspect Fraud in
Afghanistan Election; U.N. Will Investigate, BALT. SUN, Oct. 10, 2004, at 1A.
226. Id.
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people from voting more than once, each voter's thumb was marked
with an indelible ink.227 Astonishingly, the indelible ink proved
anything but, washing away with soap and water.22 This problem
prompted all fifteen candidates opposing Karzai to call for a
boycott halfway through the election. 229 Nonetheless, as international
organizations pronounced the ballot "mostly fair" the opposition
candidates backed down.23° On November 3, 2004, following an
endorsement by the United Nations-Afghan electoral commission
that the election was free and fair, Hamid Karzai was declared the
winner of Afghanistan's first-ever presidential election with fifty-five
percent of the vote.231 He was inaugurated on December 7, 2004 for
a five-year term.232
Prior to the elections, the Afghan government, international
donors, and NGOs made great efforts to encourage female voter
registration by "start[ing] civic education programs, hir[ing] female
election workers, permit[ting] women to get voter registration cards
without photographs, and provid[ing] regularly updated registration
figures disaggregated by gender."23 Their efforts paid off. Official
tallies record that of the 10.5 million registered voters, forty-one
percent were women.234 Nonetheless, "in some areas, fear of attacks
prevented mobile registration teams from going door-to-door prior
to the election," resulting in "appallingly low [ten percent in some
provinces] female registration rates in the south." '235 In one tragic
incident "a bomb targeting a bus full of female election workers...
killed three and injured [twelve] ."236
As she courageously stood for the presidency at the Emergency
Loya Jirga, Massouda Jalal was the only female presidential candi-
date in the election. 2"7 During the campaign, she repeatedly received
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Anne Barnard, Protests Lose Force Day After Afghan Election, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
11, 2004, at Al.
231. It's Official: Karzai Wins Presidency, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2004, at 28.
232. Eric Schmitt & Carlotta Gall, Karzai Is Sworn in, Citing a 'New Chapter' for
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at A8.
233. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WOMEN AND ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN (2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/afghanistan.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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threats and was prevented "from speaking at an Afghan New Year
celebration at the central shrine in Mazar-e Sharif .... ,23" None-
theless, Jalal finished sixth out of eighteen candidates and received
100,000 votes, slightly more than one percent.239 She is now serving
as the Minister of Women's Affairs in the Karzai government.24 °
The country which President Karzai inherited as president was
one in which "[v]irtually all the institutions of a functioning civil
society had been destroyed, including the parliament, the courts,
much of the civil service, and most of the educational and health
systems. 24' Much of the country's infrastructure had been reduced
to rubble in the previous twenty years and over ten million landmines
- one for every three Afghans - littered the country.242 A 2004
report by the United Nations Development Programme ranked
Afghanistan 173 out of 178 countries in the Human Development
Index, which measures the progress of nations on key social and
economic indicators.243
Despite these and other challenges, Afghanistan has made
remarkable accomplishments in the past four years. A 2005 report
explained:
In contrast to the last decades where women were almost absent
in all facets of political and public life, progress can be observed in
these spheres... the first female Presidential candidate stood for
elections in October 2004; in January 2005 the first woman was
appointed as Governor of a province; the head of the national
human rights commission is a woman. Although few in number
and lacking decision-making power, women are employed in the
criminal justice sector; and an active, vigorous civil society is
emerging, wherein women are actively participating.'
The Afghan government is responsible for much of this progress.
Amnesty International indicates:
238. Id.
239. MIDDLE EAST INST. POLICY BRIEF: AFGHANISTAN'S NEXT STEPS: COMMENTARY ON THE
RECENT AND UPCOMING ELECTIONS (2005), http://www.mideasti.org/articles/ doc351.html.
240. Id.
241. AFGHANISTAN'S BONN AGREEMENT, supra note 199.
242. LANDMINE MONITOR, supra note 89.
243. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004,
AFGHANISTAN, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES (2004),
http://www.undp. org/dpa/nhdr/af-files/ForewordPrefaceintro.pdf.
244. AMNESTY INTL USA, AFGHANISTAN: WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK - A SYSTEMATIC
FAILURE TO PROTECT (2005), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=8BFA55243
28779D88025700B00425BF9.
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The Afghan government has taken incremental steps to begin to
address the issue of the realisation [sic] of women's rights and
gender equality. In the Berlin Conference in late March 2004, the
Afghan government outlined to international donor states its
commitments to promote. the participation of women in the
reconstruction of Afghanistan and to ensure equal rights in the
political, social and economic sphere. AS part of concrete measures
to promote gender equality, a gender unit has been established in
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. An inter-
ministerial Task Force has been created, which is committed to
combating violence against women..... The Ministry of Women's
Affairs (MoWA) has begun consultations with various ministries
to develop a national action plan for-women. 5
In the field of education, since late 2001, enrollment in schools
has increased significantly.24 Nonetheless, as Human Rights Watch
reported in 2004, more than half of Afghanistan's children still do
not attend primary school and of those enrolled, only thirty-four
percent are girls, who also have high drop-out rates.247 Moreover,
only nine percent of all girls attending primary school go on to
secondary school.2 48 "While the government reports that over 80
percent of girls in Kabul attend primary school, in some provinces
girls' enrollment rates have shown little progress., 24' For example,
"[o]nly one out of every one hundred girls in Zabul and Badghis
provinces attend primary school."250 Further, in the past two years,
local warlords "have attacked or burned dozens of girls' schools."251
In Kandahar, warlords had leaflets distributed with the message,
"Isitop sending your women to offices and daughters to schools. It
spreads indecency and vulgarity. Stand ready for the consequences
if you do not heed the advice. 252
Today, warlords represent the primary threat to peace and
security in Afghanistan.5 3 While President Karzai "nominally acts
as president of Afghanistan, outside of Kabul, much of the country
245. Id.(citations omitted).
246. BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR, supra note 69, at 7.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND.: ATTACKS ON GIRLS' SCHOOLS IN AFGHANISTAN (2005),
http://www.feminist.org/afghan/Girls%27-SchoolsAttacks.pdf.
253. AFGHANISTAN'S BONN AGREEMENT, supra note 199.
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remains under the de facto control of warlords ' 254 who "routinely
abuse human rights, especially the rights of women and girls. 255 As
Human Rights Watch has warned, "[t]he power of the warlords has
... hindered any discernible progress in making the transition from
a militarized to a genuinely civilian government. 256 Indeed, the
physical security situation is so precarious that "Karzai's vice
president was assassinated and Karzai himself narrowly avoided
assassination, necessitating the commitment of a cordon of U.S.
diplomatic security personnel to ensure his safety." '257 As long as the
warlords retain their grip on power, and loyalty in Afghanistan
remains at the local, rather than national, level, both the govern-
ment in Kabul and the international community will be unable to
effectively address the staggering social and economic problems
confronting the Afghan people.
As the Karzai government "is not powerful enough to confront
the warlords on its own ... [iut needs the sustained and genuine
commitment of the United States and others . .. ."25 Yet thus
far there has been little commitment within the international
community to take the necessary steps, arguably the most impor-
tant of which would be the expansion of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), a peacekeeping mission deployed to Kabul
and surrounding areas.259
ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. Its
purpose is to assist the Afghan government by creating a secure
environment which will allow for fair and free elections; reconstruc-
tion projects; the rule of law; and the disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) of militia forces into civilian life. 2"° Annex
One to the Bonn Agreement states:
Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan
security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning,
the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request the
254. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,1489 (2003).
255. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH: AFGHANISTAN: U.N. RIGHTS MONITORING STILL NEEDED
(2005), http://hrw.orglenglish/docs/2005/04/20/afghanlO5l5.htm.
256. AFGHANISTAN'S BONN AGREEMENT, supra note 199.
257. Koh, supra note 254, at 1489-90.
258. AFGHANISTAN'S BONN AGREEMENT, supra note 199. Inexplicably, the international
community continues to support the warlords. Id. The United States "has admitted to arming
local warlords as late as October of 2002; Iran and Pakistan also continue to supply and
assist local commanders." Id.
259. AFGHANISTAN'S BONN AGREEMENT, supra note 199.
260. See INT'L RESCUE COMM., THE EXPANSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ASSISTANCE FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN (2004), http://www.theirc.orgindex.cfm/ wwwID/1844.
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United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early
deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force.
This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and
its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be pro-
gressively expanded to other urban centres and other areas. 61
In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council
authorized the deployment of ISAF to Kabul.262 Two years later the
Security Council authorized expansion of ISAF "in areas of
Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs . "..."263 Also in
2003, command and coordination for ISAF shifted from the United
Nations to NATO.264 ISAF was NATO's first mission outside the
Euro-Atlantic area.265
In Kabul, ISAF has proven a remarkable success. Yet because
ISAF has yet to expand beyond the environs of Kabul, the rest of
the country remains under the control of warlords and drug-lords.
Human Rights Watch notes:
The primary reason ISAF has not been expanded has been the
opposition of the United States, which refused to consider
expansion beyond Kabul at the time of its creation. The U.S. later
modified its position and said it would not oppose expansion, but
it also said it would not contribute troops.... 266
Regrettably, "[o]ther states are also responsible for the failure of
ISAF to expand .... France, Canada, Australia... Germany and
the Netherlands, have thus far refused to participate in an
expansion of the force. 267
261. Provisional Agreement, supra note 201, at Annex 1.
262. S.C. Res. 1386, U.N.SCOR, 4443rd mtg., 20 Dec. 2001, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (2001).
263. S.C. Res. 1510, U.N.SCOR, 4840th mtg., 13 Oct. 2003, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1510 (2003).
264. See NATO, NATO IN AFGHANISTAN FACTSHEET (2005), http://www.nato.int/
issues/afghanistan/ [hereinafter NATO IN AFGHANISTAN]. "ISAF is not a U.N. force, but it is
deployed under a mandate of the U.N.S.C. (four SCRs- 1386, 1413, 1444, and 1510 - relate
to ISAF)". Id. See generally S.C. Res. 1386, U.N.SCOR, 4443rd mtg., 20 Dec. 2001, U.N. Doc.
SIRES/1386 (2001); S.C. Res. 1413, U.N.SCOR, 4541st mtg., 23 May 2002, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1413 (2002); S.C. Res. 1444, U.N.SCOR, 4651st mtg., 27 Nov. 2002, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1444 (2002); S.C. Res. 1510, U.N.SCOR, 4840th mtg., 13 Oct. 2003, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1510 (2003).
265. NATO IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 264.
266. AFGHANISTAN'S BONN AGREEMENT, supra note 199.
267. Id.
As of 2005, ISAF is responsible for approximately 8,000268 troops
in Afghanistan, comprised of soldiers from thirty-six NATO countries,
nine partner and two non-NATO/non-partner countries.2 The figure
of 8,000 troops should be compared with other Chapter VII missions.
The peacekeeping force in Bosnia, for example, had 62,000 troops; the
Kosovo mission had 48,000 troops; the Somalia mission had 28,000
troops; and the Sierra Leone mission had over 17,000 troops. °
"According to a 2003 study by CARE International, Afghanistan has
the lowest rate of peacekeepers to population of any recent post-
conflict nation. Kosovo had one peacekeeper for 48 people; East Timor
had one peacekeeper for every 86, while Afghanistan has just one for
every 5,380 people. 271 Once again, Afghanistan does not seem to rate
high enough in the international community's "value system."
Indeed, with limited resources and Iraq requiring huge expen-
ditures in money and troops, it appears as though the American
administration has forgotten about Afghanistan. A February 2003
editorial in The New York Times suggests that the administration
initially allocated zero dollars to Afghan reconstruction and it was
only when embarrassed Congressional staff members recognized the
oversight and wrote in a paltry $300 million that the lapse was
covered.272 The United States has been equally penurious with troop
funding: of the roughly 8,000 troops serving in ISAF in February
2005, eighty-nine were American.273
Despite such disappointments, there is still hope. In the
summer of 2004, "at the Summit meeting of NATO Heads of State
and Government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would
establish four provincial reconstruction teams [PRTs]2 74 in the
North of the country .. ,,275 A year later, on May 31, 2005 NATO
announced that it had significantly expanded ISAF into the
provinces of Herat and Farah in the West of Afghanistan with plans
268. While this number is generally stable, "individual contributions by each individual
country... change on a regular basis due to the rotation of troops." NATO IN AFGHANISTAN,
supra note 264.
269. Id.
270. FEMINIST MAJORITY FouND., CAMPAIGN FOR AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS,
AFGHANISTAN: WHERE'S THE MARSHALL PLAN? (2005), http://www.feminist.org/afghan/
ExpandISAF.asp.
271. Id.
272. Paul Krugman, The Martial Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at A27.
273. NATO IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 264.
274. Id. NATO describes a PRT as a "civil-military partnership to facilitate the
development of a secure environment and reconstruction in the Afghan regions." Id.
275. NATO, NATO IN AFGHANISTAN, How DID THIS OPERATION EVOLVE? (2005),
http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/evolution.htm.
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of two other PRTs being operational in the west by late summer
2005.276 As of this writing, NATO continues to prepare the expan-
sion of ISAF into the south of the country.77
EPILOGUE
In September 20041 began studying for a Master of Law Degree
(LL.M) at George Washington University in the United States. Upon
receiving my degree in 2005 1 returned to Afghanistan. My hope is
to work as a judge. If that is not possible I will find other ways to
serve my country. For the first time, Iam able to look at my country's
future with hope. Like Heda Margolius Kovdly, I too now "know for
certain that love and hope are infinitely more powerful than hate
and fury, and . . . beyond the line of my horizon there [is] life
indestructible, always triumphant.' 
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